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Abstract—The cryptocurrency market is a very huge market
without effective supervision. It is of great importance for
investors and regulators to recognize whether there are market
manipulation and its manipulation patterns. This paper proposes
an approach to mine the transaction networks of exchanges
for answering this question. By taking the leaked transaction
history of Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange as a sample, we first divide
the accounts into three categories according to its characteristic
and then construct the transaction history into three graphs.
Many observations and findings are obtained via analyzing the
constructed graphs. To evaluate the influence of the accounts’
transaction behavior on the Bitcoin exchange price, the graphs
are reconstructed into series and reshaped as matrices. By using
singular value decomposition (SVD) on the matrices, we identify
many base networks which have a great correlation with the
price fluctuation. When further analyzing the most important
accounts in the base networks, plenty of market manipulation
patterns are found. According to these findings, we conclude that
there was serious market manipulation in Mt. Gox exchange and
the cryptocurrency market must strengthen the supervision.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, Blockchian, Transaction network, Tem-
poral network, Singular value decomposition
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin has become one of the hottest buzzwords among
investors and researchers. It is the first and most famous decen-
tralized digital currency [1], which is secured by cryptography
(thus, we call it cryptocurrency). Unlike fiat currencies which
usually issued by financial institutions, there is no centralized
organization or country controlling the issue and operation of
Bitcoin. Furthermore, because of decentralization, users in the
Bitcoin system are anonymous. The two characteristics (i.e.,
decentralization and anonymity) make Bitcoin attract a lot of
users since its creation in 2009. It is estimated that there are
more than 10 million users in the Bitcoin system [2].
Since the famous “Bitcoin Pizza Day” when a programmer
bought two pizzas with 10,000 BTC on May 22, 2010, Bitcoin
began to exchange with fiat currencies. Soon afterward, a
Bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox launched. By 2013 and before
filing for bankruptcy protection in February 2014, Mt. Gox
was the largest bitcoin intermediary and the world’s leading
Bitcoin exchange [3]. Nowadays, there are more than 1,700
cryptocurrencies inspired by Bitcoin and the daily transaction
volume is over $ 150 billion dollar according to coinmarket-
cap.com at the moment of writing this paper.
∗ Zibin Zheng and Chuan Chen are both corresponding authors.
The huge fluctuation of the exchange price of cryptocur-
rency is an important reason to attract investors’ participation.
Figure 1 shows the Bitcoin price (i.e., the exchange rate
between Bitcoin and USD dollar in this paper) from 2012/12 to
2015/6. During this period, the Bitcoin price rose sharply from
about $10/BTC to exceeding $1,000/BTC and then fell back
to below $200/BTC. This extreme price fluctuation has also
attracted a large number of researchers to find the determinant
factors of the Bitcoin price. Four categories of factors are
discussed, including 1) economic factors (e.g., the supply and
demand of Bitcoin) [4]; 2) technical factors (e.g., hash rate and
difficulty) [5]; 3) interest factors (through proxy variable such
as Google trends) [6]; and 4) other financial assets (e.g., gold,
stock). In addition, by using the principal component analysis
method (analogous to SVD), the paper [7] indicates that the
Bitcoin price has a strong correlation with the transactions on
the blockchain ledger.
2012-12 2013-05 2013-11 2014-5 2014-11 2015-05
Date
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
US
D/
BT
C 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
e
exchange price
Fig. 1. Bitcoin-USD exchange price at Bitstamp exchange, with the period
being studied shaded.
However, these factors are discussed based on data outside
the exchanges. Because of the lack of supervision, a nature
conjecture is that the extreme fluctuation may be related to
the market manipulation of the exchanges. This conjecture is
hard to verify as it is very difficult to obtain the detailed
trading data from the trading platform. Surprisingly, many
transaction histories from April 2011 to November 2013 of
the once famous Bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox were leaked in the
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form of CSV files. These data provide a perfect opportunity
for answering the conjecture.
To verify whether there is market manipulation and identify
possible manipulation patterns is urgent and of great impor-
tance, as plenty of investors who are dreaming of getting
rich overnight are attracted to the market. The answer to this
question will help investors recognize the potential risks and
help to regulate legislation. Based on the leaked data, a recent
paper [8] points out that the Mt. Gox exchange manipulated
the Bitcoin price by building a regression model to identify
the influence of the activities of some suspicious accounts on
the price. We adopt a completely different method compared
with it and obtain more results including fake volume, price
manipulation, and manipulation patterns.
Figure 2 shows an overview of our analysis. We first verify
the leaked data and remove many unreasonable records. Then,
by comparing the transaction price with the disclosed Mt.
Gox price in quandl.com, we find many abnormal transac-
tions. By using these transactions, we divide the accounts
into three categories: extreme high account (EHA), extreme
low account (ELA), and normal account (NMA). Next, we
construct the extreme high graph (EHG), extreme low graph
(ELG) and normal graph (NMG) by seeing the accounts as
nodes and transactions as edges. we conduct various graph
structure analysis on EHG, ELG, and NMG, such as nodes
and edges classification, measuring graph clusters and degree
distribution. Such investigation leads to new observations and
findings. For example, the abnormal accounts (i.e., EHA and
ELA) might be controlled by the exchange and used to
provide liquidity and fake volume for the exchange. Finally,
by dividing the graphs into daily snapshots and reconstructing
it in a matrix, we extract some base graphs through singular
value decomposition (SVD). By doing this, we find that the
abnormal accounts’ transactions strongly related to the Bitcoin
price. Furthermore, we find many strange transaction patterns
(such as self-loop, bi-direction, triangle etc.) within abnormal
accounts. These patterns are considered as evidence of market
manipulation in the exchange.
Fig. 2. An overview of our analysis.
In summary, we make the following major contributions.
• To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study on
market manipulation of cryptocurrency via graph analysis
and SVD. Besides, we prove the effectiveness of the
method by applying to the leaked Mt. Gox transaction
data.
• We obtain many new observations and findings by char-
acterizing the activities of different accounts (i.e., static
network analysis) and adopting SVD on the daily snap-
shots of the graphs (i.e., temporal network analysis).
These findings convinced us that there are many market
manipulation behaviors in the exchange.
• We detect many market manipulation patterns which have
never been reported in this area. These patterns are strong
evidence of market manipulation and can help investors
and regulators to recognize the dark side and its severity
of the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After intro-
ducing the data set in Section II, we detail the static network
analysis in Section III and the temporal network analysis in
Section IV. Finally, we provide some related works in Section
V and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. DATA SET
In early 2014, the transaction history from April 2011 to
November 2013 of Mt. Gox was leaked in the form of CSV
files. Table I reports a segment of the leaked data recorded
on 2013/10/01. Two rows with the same Trade Id indicating
a complete transaction from the seller (Type=sell) to the
buyer (Type=buy). The volume of the transaction is recorded
in Bitcoins and the turnover in Money, thus the real-time
price of Bitcoin at the transaction moment is Money/Bitcoins.
Each user has a unique identity (User Id) with the FIPS
location codes recorded in the country (User Country) and
state (User State) fields. There are some other attributes (e.g.,
transaction fees) not included in the table, as they are not used
in this study.
Data Cleaning. As there are many duplicate entries in the
leaked data, we adopt a similar way for data cleaning as the
previous studies [3], [8]. Specifically, we use the combination
of the four key fields: date, user ID, type, and Bitcoins to
remove duplicated entries (de-duplication strategy 2 in [3]).
After this step, we remove all the single row transaction to
make sure that each transaction has the corresponding buyer
and seller (i.e., a completed transaction). Then, we remove
all duplicated complete transactions. By doing this, the data
narrows from approximately 18 million rows to 13.5 million
rows (i.e, 6.7 million completed transactions). This method is
more strict than the method in [8] as complete transactions
with the same trade id are treated as duplicates. We adopt
a more strict method in the hope of providing more reliable
results.
Advantages. The leaked Mt. Gox data has many advantages
in understanding the transaction behaviors in cryptocurrency
and its influence on the price. First of all, Mt. Gox was the
dominant exchange and Bitcoin has been the main cryptocur-
rency during the period, thus analyzing the cryptocurrency
market based on this data set is more reliable and represen-
tative. Second, these data are much more finely grained than
TABLE I
A SEGMENT OF THE LEAKED DATA.
Trade Id Date User Id Type Currency Bitcoins Money User Country User State
1380587338975940 2013/10/1 0:28:58 125439 buy USD 0.5 71.69169 US NC
1380587338975940 2013/10/1 0:28:58 295701 sell USD 0.5 71.69169 CA QC
1380739642844790 2013/10/2 18:47:22 609336 buy USD 0.26177217 33.96631 US PA
1380739642844790 2013/10/2 18:47:22 36865 sell USD 0.26177217 33.96631 US CA
data extracted from the blockchain since most trading activity
is recorded only in the exchange. Furthermore, users can be
identified by their accounts in the leaked data while it is hard
in blockchain to identify a user because of its anonymous
mechanism.
III. STATIC NETWORK ANALYSIS
A. Account Classification
Before delving deeper into the Mt. Gox leaked data, we
check the Bitcoin exchange price of each transaction (i.e.,
Money/Bitcoin) to inspect whether it falls between the highest
and lowest exchange price of the disclosed price on the same
day. To this end, we first download all the Bitcoin exchange
rate (BTC vs. USD) on Mt. Gox from quandl.com (we call
this reference price). Then, we compare the exchange price
of each transaction with the reference price. Surprisingly,
we find that there are some abnormal transactions which
have a very high or low exchange price. For example, on
2013/08/30, a transaction (trade ID=1377875127221631) had
an exchange price of $49,338.4/BTC, and another transaction
(trade ID=1377876535345547) had an exchange price of only
$0.81/BTC, whereas, on the same day, the highest and lowest
exchange price in the download data are $142.76/BTC and
$128.56/BTC respectively.
These transactions are abnormal, as the exchange price is
clearly out of the reasonable range. In order to distinguish the
transaction behavior of different accounts and its influence on
the price, we divide all the accounts into three categories:
extremely high account (EHA), extremely low account (ELA)
and normal account (NMA). As a first step, we apply a simple
approach to identify an abnormal transaction. For this, suppose
the highest and the lowest reference price on day t is Ht
and Lt, we regard an transaction with real-time price larger
than 1.5 × Ht as an extremely high price transaction (EHT)
and with real-time price lower than 0.5× Lt as an extremely
low price transaction (ELT). Both kinds of transactions are
referred to as abnormal transactions (ABTs). Please note that
we use (0.5 × Lt, 1.5 × Ht) instead of (Lt, Ht) to identify
an abnormal transaction because there are many exchanges
(thus many reference price) at the same time and we cannot
make sure the reference price is the real price of the exchange.
However, the parameter 0.5 and 1.5 is enough to exclude any
normal transaction. Finally, an account is an EHA if it has at
least one extremely high price transaction and an ELA if it has
at least one extremely low price transaction. Both EHAs and
ELAs are referred to as abnormal accounts (ABA). Please note
that abnormal accounts could be both an EHA and an ELA if it
involves both EHT and ELT. NMA is an account involved in no
TABLE II
STATICS OF ACCOUNTS AND TRANSACTIONS.
Category #accounts #Tx #ABT #EHT #ELT
EHA 10702 1406850 179701 138743 40958
ELA 5835 2486807 85784 29737 56047
ABA 14916 3025992 194790 138743 56047
NMA 104427 812865 0 0 0
All 119343 6775117 194790 138743 56047
abnormal transactions, that is to say, all involved transactions
are normal transactions (NMT).
Table II shows the number of accounts and all kinds of
transactions for each category of accounts. Four observations
can be made from the table: 1) there are 14916 abnormal
accounts, which account for 12.5% (14916/119343) of all the
accounts (please note that the number of ABA is not the
sum of the number of EHA and ELA due to the existence
of accounts contained in both categories); 2) the proportion
of abnormal transactions (#ABT) among ABAs accounts for
2.8% (≈194790/6775117); 3) the number of normal transac-
tions among ABAs (3025992-194790=2831202) account for
more than 41% (2831202/6775117) of all transactions; and 4)
the sum of the number of transactions (#Tx) among ABAs
and NMAs is far less than the number of all transactions, thus
many transactions occurred between ABA and NMA.
Based on these observations, one can confirm that the abnor-
mal transactions do not occur by accident (observation 2) and
the abnormal accounts behave normally in most of their times
(observation 3). Thus, the existence of the abnormal accounts
must have a certain special purpose. One of the most likely
purposes is for providing liquidity (observation 4, Section
III-C). Considering the analysis on the recent cryptocurrency
market of a trader and investor, which report that in some
exchanges most of their disclosed trading volume are fake [9],
another possible purpose for these accounts is for fake volume.
Besides, price manipulation is also a likely purpose (Section
IV). In fact, we find that the abnormal transactions are greatly
correlated with the Bitcoin exchange price and there are many
abnormal patterns in the transactions.
B. Graph Construction
As each transaction contains a buyer and a seller, we
can easily construct a directed graph from the records by
considering each account as a node. Specifically, we present
the definition of the constructed graph G as follows.
Graph Definition. G = (V,E,w), where V is a set of
nodes represent users (denoted by user ID) in the leaked data,
E is a set of edges with each represents an ordered pair of
nodes and w is the function associating each edge to a weight.
Each pair indicates that there was at least one transaction
between users u (seller) and v (buyer) in the whole dataset.
w : E → R+ maps each edge with a weight, which is the
total amount of Bitcoins transferred along the edge by one or
more transactions.
In the remainder of this paper, we use the term account,
user and node interchangeably. To better compare network
characteristics, we construct three graphs according to the
nodes’ categories as follows:
• EHG. The graph that all nodes are EHAs.
• ELG. The graph that all nodes are ELAs.
• NMG. The graph that all nodes are NMAs.
To construct the graph we adopt the following steps. Since
each complete transaction has both a buy and sell record
(has the same transaction ID) after data validation, we first
construct a set of tuples (S,B, v, t, l) from every complete
transaction, where S and B represents the seller and buyer
(denoted by user ID), v is the corresponding amount of the
transaction in Bitcoin, t is the transaction time and l is a label
indicating the category of the transaction (i.e., EHT, ELT or
NMT). We call this set as transaction tuple, as each tuple
corresponds to a unique transaction. Based on the transaction
tuple, the aforementioned graphs are easy to construct. For
example, to construct the EHG, we select all the tuples in
which both the seller and the buyer are EHAs and sum the v
entry grouped by S and B. Then, the generated new tuples
(S,B, v) is the EHG. Other graphs are constructed as the same
except by selecting different tuples according to the nodes’
category.
C. Graph Analysis
This subsection investigates the constructed graphs from
various metrics in graph analysis. Figure 3 shows the three
graphs. We can find that there are more nodes in NMG,
indicating the NMG is more sparse in connection (note that we
select 5,000 edges for each graph). We investigate the statistics
and metrics in the following.
(a) EHG (b) ELG (c) NMG
Fig. 3. Visualization of EHG, ELG, and NMG. For the ease of illustration,
we randomly select 5000 edges from each graph to draw the figure.
Table III shows all the statistics and metrics for each
constructed graph. For comparison, we also constructed the
abnormal graph (i.e., the graph of all abnormal accounts,
ABG) and the complete graph (i.e, the graph of all accounts,
CG). In the following, we first introduce the statistics or
metrics and then detail the observations.
The number of nodes in each graph is the number of
accounts in each category, which is in accordance with the
statistics in Table II. The only exception is that the number
of nodes in NMG is less than the number of NMA, because
some normal accounts interact with abnormal accounts, thus
it is not included the NMG.
TABLE III
STATICS OF GRAPHS.
graph # nodes # edges cluster avg. degree avg. wgt. degree
EHG 10702 212900 0.30 19.89 505.43
ELG 5835 413881 0.42 70.93 3107.68
ABG 14916 612885 0.31 41.09 1439.04
NMG 86457 655882 0.03 7.59 76.21
CG 119343 2682719 0.28 22.48 426.54
An edge in the graph indicates a “channel” between two
accounts for buying or selling Bitcoin. As can be seen from
the table, the number of edges in each graph is far less than
the number of transactions, which means that many channels
are used more than one times. Another notable result is that
the summation of the number of edges in ABG and NMG is
greatly less than the number of edges in the CG. This result
indicates that many edges are the channels between normal and
abnormal accounts and is evidence that the abnormal accounts
provide liquidity in the exchange. The number of edges in
ABG is slightly larger than the sum of the number of edges in
EHG and ELG since there are some edges connecting EHAs
and ELAs.
We compute the clustering coefficient of all the graphs
in column 4 of Table III. As can be seen, the clustering
coefficients are extremely different among EHG, ELG, and
NMG. The large clustering coefficients (i.e., 0.3 in EHG and
0.42 in ELG) revealing that if two abnormal accounts A,B
trade with abnormal account C, A and B are very likely to
trade with each other. In other words, the abnormal accounts
are likely to form triangles through transactions. Conversely,
the clustering coefficient of NMG is very small (i.e., 0.03),
which indicates a normal situation as the probability of three
normal accounts forming a triangle is very small. This result
indicates that the abnormal accounts behave strangely and
herald the existence of market manipulation in the exchange.
The degree of a node is the number of edges connecting
to the node. In our case, the degree of a node indicates the
number of accounts trading with that node. Figure 4 shows
the degree distribution of all the three graphs, all of which
approximately follows the power law distribution, meaning
that there are few large-degree nodes and many small-degree
nodes. We estimate the parameters by using the free statistical
software R [10] and the contributed package [11] and plot
the fitting line y ∼ x−α for each distribution in red. The
smaller the α, the more variable of nodes’ degree. Thus,
the abnormal accounts show less variable as compared with
normal accounts. The result may be due to the abnormal
accounts are controlled by the same organizations.
(a) EHG (b) ELG (c) NMG
Fig. 4. Degree distribution of EHG, ELG and NMG.
Column 5 and 6 in Table III show the average degree
and the weighted average degree of the graphs. The large
average degrees of EHG and ELG indicate that the abnormal
accounts are used more frequently than normal accounts. The
weighted degree is computed by setting the transaction volume
(i.e., Bitcoin) as the weight, thus the average weighted degree
represents the average transaction volume for each edge. As
can be seen, the average weighted degree of ELG is far larger
than it of EHG, one possible reason that the exchange price
of transactions in ELG is relatively low, thus the transaction
volume is large. Whatever the reason is, an obvious fact
remains that the average weighted degree of EHG and ELG
are larger than that of NMG, which means the edges between
abnormal accounts transfer more Bitcoin than edges between
normal accounts.
Based on the results and analysis discussed above, we
summarize the findings as follows:
• Finding 1. There are some abnormal accounts (12.5%)
which trading with very high or low exchange price in
some transactions. We consider these accounts abnormal
and under control by the exchange for two reasons: 1)
the proportion of the abnormal transactions account for
2.8%, thus it is not occurred by accident; 2) the abnormal
exchange price is impossible to appear on ordinary users.
• Finding 2. Many seemingly normal transactions occurred
between abnormal accounts ( > 41%). There are two pos-
sible purposes for these transactions: 1) these transactions
are the fake volume that used to create an illusion of
active trading; 2) to provide liquidity for the exchange.
• Finding 3. The graphs of abnormal accounts have very
large clustering coefficients. One possible reason is that
these accounts are controlled by one organization, and
thus the trade is not completely random.
These findings indicate that the exchange was likely in-
volved in trading manipulation. As the exchange price is the
key factor of trading, in the following section, we will discuss
the possibility of price manipulation of the exchange.
IV. TEMPORAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
As discussed above, the transaction network of abnormal
accounts (i.e., EHG and ELG) show a great difference from
the NMG. We want to know whether these transactions have a
correlation with the Bitcoin price and what kind of users and
transactions (i.e., graph structure) influence the Bitcoin price
greatly. To this end, we calculate the daily snapshots of the
graphs by adopting the method similar to III-B. To detect im-
portant changes in the graph structure, we compare successive
snapshots of the graphs using singular value decomposition
(SVD). The goal is to detect a set of base networks and
represents each day’s snapshot as a linear combination of these
base networks. Unlike in Section III, we focused our study
on transaction data after 2012/12/01 in this section. There
are many reasons supporting our choice. Firstly, the recent
paper which proves the price manipulation of Mt. Gox uses
the same transaction history [8]. Secondly, the Bitcoin price
experienced a skyrocketing during this period. Thirdly, Mt.
Gox was the main Bitcoin exchange during this period. Finally,
more abnormal users and transactions (more than 60%) are
found after that day.
A. Extract Base Networks
To evaluate which networks influence the price greatly, we
need to construct the daily snapshots of the three graphs:
EHGt, ELGt and NMGt. We adopt the same process to
construct the graph series. First of all, we construct the aggre-
gate networks (i.e., EHG) based on tuples after 2012/12/01.
Assume there are n nodes and L edges in the aggregate
network, then it can be represented by a n × n weighted
adjacency matrix G, in which there are L non-zero elements.
We rearrange G into an L long vector g containing all the non-
zero elements. We call this vector as edge-weight vector. The
vector describes the graph structure of the aggregate network
as each element represents a possible edge and its weight. To
construct the daily snapshots of EHGt on day t, we recalculate
the edge-weight vector gt (i.e., the graph structure on day t)
based on transaction tuples on day t. Please note that we do
not change the order of the vector, thus the i-th element of all
the edge-weight vectors indicate the same edge, and it may
be zero if the edge does not exist on a specific day. For T
snapshots, we now build the T×L graph time series matrix X
such that the t-th row of X equals gt. By doing this, we build
a special matrix with T samples and each sample represents
a daily graph structure.
To account for the variation of the daily graph structure, we
normalize X such that the sum of each row equals 1, and then
subtract the column averages from each column. As a result,
both the row and column sums in the matrix will be zero. We
compute the singular value decomposition of the matrix X:
X = UΣV T , (1)
where U is a T×T unitary matrix, Σ is a T×L diagonal matrix
with non-negative values on the diagonal, and V is a L × L
unitary matrix. The non-negative values on the diagonal are
sigular values and is usually sorted in descending order. The
left-singular vectors containing in the column of U are a set
of orthonormal eigenvectors of XXT , and the right-singular
vectors containing in the column of V are a set of orthonormal
eigenvectors of XTX .Since in this case T < L, there are
only T nonzero sigular values. We denote the sorted sigular
values as (σ1, · · · , σT ), the left-sigular vectors (u1, · · · ,uT )
and the right-sigular vectors (v1, · · · ,vT ), where ui and vi
are column vectors and subject to the following equations:
ui
T ∗ uj = viT ∗ vj = δij . (2)
Based on the special meaning of matrix X , we can interpret
the singular vectors and the singular values as 1) the right-
singular vectors can be seen as base networks, and the element
vi(l) (i.e., the l-th element of the i-th right-singular vector)
gives the weight of the l-th edge in the i-th base network;
2) the left-singular vectors account for the temporal variation
of the base networks, the t-th value of ui (denotes as ui(t))
provides the contribution of the i-th base network on day t;
3) the singular value σi, which are the square roots of the
non-zero eigenvalues of both XTX and XXT , indicates the
overall importance of the i-th base network in approximating
the whole matrix. Please note that the singular values are
sorted in decreasing order, thus give decreasing contribution
to the result.
B. Detecting Graph Structural Changes
As the (normalized) weight of the l-th edge in the daily
graph structure on day t can be written as:
xtl =
T∑
i=1
σiui(t)vi(l), (3)
to detect graph structural changes, we need to consider two
terms: σi (i.e., the importance of the i-th base network) and
ui(t) (i.e., the contribution of the i-th base network on day t).
As a first glance, we consider the daily influence of the
first and also the most important base network (i.e., u1(t)).
We want to know the correlation between the variation of
u1(t) and the fluctuation of the Bitcoin exchange price. As
the range of the price is (12, 1207), we adopt a simple
mathematical transform to make sure most of the transformed
price falls in the interval (0, 1). Specifically, we adopt the
log transform B(t) = log1000P (t), where P (t) is the close
exchange price of Bitcoin on day t. Table IV (left part) shows
three commonly used correlation coefficients (i.e., Pearson,
Spearman, and Kendall correlation coefficient) between u1(t)
and the log-transformed price B(t). The results show that
the daily variation of the first base network in EHG and
ELG have a very strong correlation with the Bitcoin exchange
price. However, in NMG, there is no correlation between the
two variables. The result indicates that the transactions made
between abnormal accounts have a great influence on the
Bitcoin exchange price.
Motivated by this result, we want to know, to what extent,
the log transfered price can be estimated with the combination
of the left-sigular vectors, i.e.,
B(t) ∼ c0 +
N∑
i=1
ciui(t), (4)
TABLE IV
CORRELATION COEFFCIENTS BETWEEN THE LEFT-SINGULAR VECTORS OF
THE NETWORK TIME SERIES MATRIX AND THE BITCOIN EXCHANGE PRICE.
Graph The 1st base network The Fitted 10 base networks
ρP ρS ρK ρP ρS ρK
EHG 0.56 0.60 0.44 0.811 0.807 0.620
ELG 0.58 0.82 0.64 0.871 0.834 0.652
NMG 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.239 0.398 0.289
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Fig. 5. Sigular values in the order of its importance.
where c0 is the mean of B(t) and ci can be computed as the
dot product of B(t) and ui(t). As the left-singular vectors are
orthonormal and span the T-dimensional linear space, B(t)
can be reconstructed by ui(t) when N = T . However, this is
not what we desire in this case. The purpose of this study is
to identify some important base networks and accounts that
have a great influence on the Bitcoin price. To proceed, we
first try to select some important base networks in the detected
base networks. We draw the scree plot of the singular values
as shown in Fig. 5. As can be seen from the graph, the curve
of the singular values is clearly leveling off at the right side of
the dotted line (i.e., the 10th singular value). Thus, we select
the first 10 base networks for the following analysis.
Before analyzing accounts in the selected base networks, we
approximate B(t) with the selected networks. To evaluate the
fitting effect, we calculate the correlation coefficients between
the fitted price series and B(t). The right part of Table
IV shows the correlation coefficients. Surprisingly, the three
correlation coefficients are greatly enhanced as compared with
the first left-singular vector. Especially, the Pearson correlation
coefficient between ELG and B(t) is 0.87, while only 0.24
between NMG and B(t). The great difference indicates a
strong correlation between abnormal accounts’ transactions
and the Bitcoin exchange price, which is a strong evidence
of the price manipulation in Mt. Gox.
Figure 6 shows the trends of B(t) and the fitted price. As
can be seen from the graph, though the shape of the peak in
April of 2013 is missed, the trends of B(t) has been grasped
by the selected base networks of EHG and ELG, whereas the
base networks in the NMG have no effect in grasping the
trend.
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Fig. 6. Approximate the log-transformed Bitcoin price with the linear combination of the selected base networks of EHG, ELG, and NMG.
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Fig. 7. The time-varying contribution ui(t) of the first four base networks.
To show the structure variation of the networks, we draw the
time-varying contribution ui(t) of the first four base networks
in Fig. 7. In most cases, ui(t) exhibit a few abrupt changes,
partitioning the history of the transaction into separate time
periods. The most notable abrupt changes are in December of
2012 when the Bitcoin exchange price is very smooth and the
November of 2013 when the price skyrocketing. During the
two periods, the effects of the first four base networks of EHG
and ELG are both significant, however, the base networks in
NMG have no distinct effect during the smooth period and
show effect only a few days during the skyrocketing period.
C. Abnormal transaction patterns
As discussed above, the transactions between abnormal
users have a great correlation with the Bitcoin exchange price.
A natural question is which edges (i.e, transactions) and thus
accounts are the most influential and whether the transactions
show certain patterns during the period. To this end, based on
the extracted 10 base networks, we further extract the top-10
ranking edges (by the absolute value of weights) in each base
networks. We find only 44 distinct edges instead of the 100
maximally possible, which including a total of 28 accounts in
EHG. In ELG, 57 edges and 46 accounts were found. We call
these core abnormal accounts.
To identify special transaction patterns, we draw the daily
subgraph of the core abnormal accounts. We find that there are
many abnormal transaction patterns (i.e., market manipulation
patterns) in the networks. In order to save space, we show
only 6 typical patterns in Fig. 8. These subgraphs are all
extracted from ELG on different days. In order to illustrate
more clearly, we fix the layout of the graph (i.e., the position
of the accounts in each graph is fixed) and denote the special
patterns in red. The size of the line denotes the number of
transactions between the two accounts. The number at the
right-hand side of the directed edge represents the number
of transactions between the two accounts. We simply explain
the 6 patterns as follows:
• Self-Loop. A pattern that an account made transactions
with itself. Figure 8a shows subgraph on 2013/02/07, the
account 231 made 749 transactions with itself. Self-Loop
is restricted for normal accounts in any exchanges, as it
makes no sense. Thus, a reasonable explanation for the
self-loop pattern is that the account may belong to the
exchange and may be used to increase daily transaction
volume or price manipulation.
• Unidirection. The unidirectional pattern indicates more
than one transaction from account A to B. Figure 8b
shows a unidirectional pattern on 2013/08/15, where
account 527332 made 322 sell transactions to account
231. It is possible for an account to sell Bitcoin to another
account for more than one times, however, it is almost
impossible for two normal accounts to interact with such
a large number of times on the same day.
• Bi-direction. The bi-directional pattern is a typical mar-
ket manipulation behavior, especially when the two ac-
counts are controlled by the same user, that two accounts
(a) Self-Loop (b) Unidirection (c) Bidirection
(d) Triangle (e) Polygon (f) Star
Fig. 8. Some typical abnormal transaction patterns
interact with each other many times. Figure 8c shows the
bi-direction pattern on 2013/04/14 where account 144834
interact with account 231 for more than 150 times.
• Triangle. The triangle pattern indicates a triangle-like
structure between three accounts. It may contain vari-
ous forms when considering the direction of the edge.
Figure 8d shows a special form of triangle pattern on
2013/10/25. It is special because the accounts form a loop
through transactions (account 282004→71885→490089
→282004).
• Polygon. Polygon pattern is a more complicated trans-
action pattern where many accounts form a polygon-like
group with each edge has more than one transactions.
Figure 8e shows a quadrangle pattern on 2013/09/19,
it seems that account 282004 sends Bitcoin to account
527332 through the “bridge accounts” 488195 and 231
for more than two hundred transactions.
• Star. A star pattern has a core account that buys or
sells Bitcoin to many accounts. Figure 8f shows a typical
star, where the account 282004 sell Bitcoin to accounts
488195, 490089, 527332 and 231.
Generally speaking, it is not surprising for a transaction
network to form a special structure, as transactions are random.
However, in our case, it is impossible as each edge represents
far more than one transaction in a single day. Thus, it seems
quite possible that these accounts are controlled by a certain
group and these transactions have special purposes.
Based on the results, we summarize the findings as follows:
• Finding 4. The daily fluctuations of the selected base
networks of EHG and ELG have a strong correlation
with the Bitcoin exchange price. On the contrary, the
daily fluctuation of the base networks of NMG has no
correlation with the Bitcoin exchange price. This finding
indicates that the behavior of the abnormal accounts’
transaction affects the fluctuation of Bitcoin exchange
price.
• Finding 5. The trend of the Bitcoin exchange price can
be captured by the selected base networks of EHG and
ELG. It means that the trend of the price can be predicted
by transactions between abnormal accounts.
• Finding 6. There are many unusual transaction patterns
(e.g., self-loop, bi-direction, star) between abnormal ac-
counts. These patterns imply that these accounts are
controlled by the same group and are strong evidence
of price manipulation.
V. RELATED WORK
Blockchain technology is a new technology, which has
many research directions and attracts the interest of researchers
from various fields [12], [13]. Our research is related to
previous work in two areas. The first related area is the
study of understanding the big fluctuation of Bitcoin price. As
aforementioned, many driving factors of the price are found.
Due to all the related data are time series, the most used
method in the analysis is time series based model such as
vector space model [14], vector error-correction model [15],
ARDL bounds testing method [16], wavelet analysis [5], and
vector autoregressive [15].
Another related area is the study of the blockchain data (i.e.,
the transaction ledger) for different topics. Due to the publicly
accessible of the blockchain data and users are anonymous in
the system, a common topic is to mine the blockchain data
to reveal users’ privacy [17]–[19]. Because of the relatively
lawless, blockchain has become an area full of various scams.
Thus, mining the blockchain data to detect scams is also a
critical topic. Recently, there are many studies on this topic,
such as Bitcoin-based scams [20], the smart contract based
Ponzi schemes [21], [22], money laundry [23], attacks [24].
See [25] for a full survey of this topic.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We conduct a systematic study to analyze the leaked Mt.
Gox transaction data through graph analysis. By comparing
the transaction price of the transaction data with the disclosed
daily price, many abnormal transactions were identified and
were used to divide the accounts into three categories. Based
on this classification, we construct three graphs (i.e., EHG,
ELG, and NMG) and obtain many findings by analyzing these
graphs through various metrics. These findings convinced us
that there are many market manipulation behaviors in the
exchange. In order to reveal the relationship between these
behaviors and the Bitcoin price, the graphs are reconstructed
into daily graph series and reshaped into matrices. Through
adopting SVD to the matrices, some very important base net-
works are identified. By inspecting the base networks, we find
that the daily variation of the abnormal base networks closely
related to the Bitcoin price and many market manipulation
patterns. Based on these findings and considering Bitcoin is
dominant in the market, we propose to strengthen supervision
in this market. In the future, we will conduct a more thorough
study of the data to reveal the extent to which the market is
affected and to discuss the changes in the behavior of investors
under the extreme fluctuation price.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work described in this paper was supported by
the National Key Research and Development Program
(2016YFB1000101),the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (61722214,11801595), the Pearl River S&T Nova
Program of Guangzhou (201710010046) and the Program for
Guangdong Introducing Innovative and Entrepreneurial Teams
(2016ZT06D211).
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[Online]. Available: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
[2] C. Burniske and A. White, “Bitcoin: Ringing the bell
for a new asset class,” 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://research.ark-invest.com/hubfs/1 Download Files ARK-Invest/
White Papers/Bitcoin-Ringing-The-Bell-For-A-New-Asset-Class.pdf
[3] A. Feder, N. Gandal, J. Hamrick, and T. Moore, “The impact of ddos
and other security shocks on bitcoin currency exchanges: Evidence from
mt. gox,” Journal of Cybersecurity, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 137–144, 2018.
[4] M. Buchholz, J. Delaney, J. Warren, and J. Parker, “Bits and bets,
information, price volatility, and demand for bitcoin,” Economics, vol.
312, 2012.
[5] L. Kristoufek, “What are the main drivers of the bitcoin price? evidence
from wavelet coherence analysis,” PloS one, vol. 10, no. 4, p. e0123923,
2015.
[6] ——, “Bitcoin meets google trends and wikipedia: Quantifying the
relationship between phenomena of the internet era,” Scientific Reports,
vol. 3, p. 3415, 2013.
[7] D. Kondor, I. Csabai, J. Szu¨le, M. Po´sfai, and G. Vattay, “Inferring the
interplay between network structure and market effects in bitcoin,” New
Journal of Physics, vol. 16, no. 12, p. 125003, 2014.
[8] N. Gandal, J. Hamrick, T. Moore, and T. Oberman, “Price manipulation
in the bitcoin ecosystem,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 95, pp.
86–96, 2018.
[9] S. Ribes, “Chasing fake volume: a crypto-plague,” Mar.
2018. [Online]. Available: https://medium.com/@sylvainartplayribes/
chasing-fake-volume-a-crypto-plague-ea1a3c1e0b5e
[10] R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical
Computing, R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria,
2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.R-project.org/
[11] C. S. Gillespie, “Fitting heavy tailed distributions: The poweRlaw
package,” Journal of Statistical Software, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 1–16,
2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.jstatsoft.org/v64/i02/
[12] Z. Zheng, S. Xie, H. Dai, X. Chen, and H. Wang, “Blockchain challenges
and opportunities: a survey,” International Journal of Web and Grid
Services, vol. 14, pp. 352–375, 2018.
[13] ——, “An overview of blockchain technology: Architecture, consensus,
and future trends,” in 2017 IEEE International Congress on Big Data
(BigData Congress). IEEE, 2017, pp. 557–564.
[14] I. Georgoula, D. Pournarakis, C. Bilanakos, D. Sotiropoulos,
and M. G. Giaglis, “Using time-series and sentiment analy-
sis to detect the determinants of bitcoin prices,” Available at
SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2607167, 2015.
[15] P. Ciaian, M. Rajcaniova, and d. Kancs, “The economics of bitcoin price
formation,” Applied Economics, vol. 48, no. 19, pp. 1799–1815, 2016.
[16] J. Bouoiyour, R. Selmi et al., “What does bitcoin look like?” Annals of
Economics and Finance, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 449–492, 2015.
[17] F. Reid and M. Harrigan, “An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin
system,” in Security and Privacy in Social Networks. Springer, 2013,
pp. 197–223.
[18] E. Androulaki, G. O. Karame, M. Roeschlin, T. Scherer, and S. Capkun,
“Evaluating user privacy in bitcoin,” in International Conference on
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 2013, pp. 34–51.
[19] S. Athey, I. Parashkevov, V. Sarukkai, and J. Xia, “Bitcoin pric-
ing, adoption, and usage: Theory and evidence,” Available at
SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826674, 2016.
[20] M. Vasek and T. Moore, “There’s no free lunch, even using Bitcoin:
Tracking the popularity and profits of virtual currency scams,” in
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
Springer, 2015, pp. 44–61.
[21] M. Bartoletti, S. Carta, T. Cimoli, and R. Saia, “Dissecting ponzi
schemes on ethereum: identification, analysis, and impact,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1703.03779, 2017.
[22] W. Chen, Z. Zheng, J. Cui, E. Ngai, P. Zheng, and Y. Zhou, “Detecting
ponzi schemes on ethereum: Towards healthier blockchain technology,”
in Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference on World Wide
Web. ACM, 2018, pp. 1409–1418.
[23] M. Moser, R. Bohme, and D. Breuker, “An inquiry into money laun-
dering tools in the bitcoin ecosystem,” in eCrime Researchers Summit
(eCRS), 2013. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–14.
[24] T. Chen, Y. Zhu, Z. Li, J. Chen, X. Li, X. Luo, X. Lin, and X. Zhange,
“Understanding ethereum via graph analysis,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2018-
IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 2018, pp.
1484–1492.
[25] W. Chen and Z. Zheng, “Blockchain data analysis: A review of status,
trends and challenges,” Journal of Computer Research and Development,
vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 1853–1870, 2018.
